From BBS to Algorithmic Cocoons: A Brief History of Chinese Internet Communities (Part 2)

Chapter Four: Vertical Breakthroughs and the Rise of Algorithms: Gen Z's Digital Territory (2014-2019)

Entering the 4G era, internet communities became fully mobile. The core narrative of this period is: how did the vertical communities that emerged in Chapter Three break out of their niches, expand, commercialize, and in the process experience the dilution and reconstruction of their community culture? Algorithmic recommendation began to replace manual curation and moderators as the core mechanism for content distribution. Bilibili moved from anime/二次元 culture toward pan-entertainment, Zhihu transitioned from elite to mass, and Xiaohongshu evolved from overseas shopping guides to a lifestyle bible—each platform struggled to balance growth with its distinctive tone.

4.1 Bilibili's Path to Breaking Out: From Anime Fortress to Youth Culture Plaza

The 100-Question Membership Exam: The Last Bastion of Community Self-Governance

In 2014, Bilibili officially launched its iconic "100-question membership exam system." New users had to complete 100 questions within two hours, covering anime culture knowledge, danmu (bullet comment) etiquette, and community norms, with a passing score of 60 or above to become official members. This mechanism represented perhaps the strictest entry barrier in Chinese internet community history, serving two purposes:

First, it functioned as a "cultural filter," keeping out "outsiders" who knew nothing about anime culture, ensuring community members shared basic cultural consensus; second, it was an "identity ritual"—the very process of passing the exam strengthened users' sense of belonging to the community. "I'm an official member who passed the exam" became a badge of honor.

During this period, Bilibili developed a unique system of community slang: "下次一定" (xiàcì yīdìng, "next time for sure"—saying you'll tip coins but not actually doing it), "一键三连" (yī jiàn sān lián, "one-click triple"—like + coin + favorite), "前方高能" (qiánfāng gāonéng, "high energy ahead"—warning of exciting content), "弹幕护体" (dànmù hù tǐ, "danmu protection"—psychological comfort during horror films). This language system served both as a marker of cultural identity and a boundary distinguishing "insiders" from "outsiders."

Expansion and Breaking Out: The Rise of the Knowledge Section

From 2016 onward, Bilibili began deliberately expanding its content boundaries. Beyond traditional anime, gaming, and kuso (parody videos), Bilibili gradually launched lifestyle, fashion, and knowledge sections. The rise of the "Knowledge Section" was particularly notable. The popularity of knowledge-focused UP hosts like Luo Xiang (legal education), Banfoxianren (financial commentary), and Wushicaijing (business analysis) proved that Bilibili users didn't just love entertainment—they equally craved deep content, just presented in a more youthful and engaging way.

This content diversification brought rapid user base growth, but also sparked complaints from old users about the platform "changing." Whenever Bilibili introduced new content categories or partnerships, the danmu and comment sections inevitably saw voices lamenting "Bilibili has changed" or "anime culture is dead." Community governance struggled to balance "expansion" with "retention."

The 2019 New Year's Eve Gala: A Milestone in Breaking Out

On December 31, 2019, Bilibili held its first "The Most Beautiful Night" New Year's Eve gala. The show blended Harry Potter symphonies, World of Warcraft dances, patriotic songs like the theme from "Liangjian" (Drawing Swords), and a collaboration between virtual singer Luo Tianyi and traditional Chinese music master Fang Jinlong... Seemingly eclectic, it precisely hit the collective memories and cultural resonance of the younger generation.

This gala sparked phenomenal social media buzz, hailed as "blowing away" traditional TV station Spring Festivals. It marked Bilibili's official transition from a niche anime community to a mainstream cultural platform, and announced that Gen Z aesthetics were beginning to define Chinese popular culture.

The "Hou Lang" (Waves Behind) Controversy: The Cost of Breaking Out

However, the cost of breaking out soon became apparent. On Youth Day 2020 (May 4), Bilibili released the promotional video "Hou Lang," featuring esteemed national first-class actor He Bing passionately saluting the younger generation: "You are fortunate to have encountered such an era, but the era is even more fortunate to have encountered you."

This video received praise from mainstream media but sparked enormous controversy within Bilibili. Old users felt the "privileged lifestyle" shown in the video (skydiving, travel, diving, racing) didn't represent real ordinary youth at all, but rather seemed like the "front waves'" imagination and gaze upon the "back waves." Criticism that "Bilibili has betrayed its grassroots and otaku culture DNA" was unceasing. This controversy reflected Bilibili's core contradiction on its commercial path: how to expand to mainstream audiences without losing the identity of core users?

4.2 Zhihu: The "Downgrade" from Elite Community to Mass Platform

Open Registration: Opening Pandora's Box

In March 2013, Zhihu announced open registration, ending two years of invitation-only access. This decision fundamentally changed Zhihu's destiny. In the following years, the user base exploded from 400,000 to tens of millions, but community atmosphere also underwent irreversible changes.

After open registration, Zhihu began seeing large amounts of "watered-down" content. "Thanks for the invite, I'm in America, just got off the plane, making a million a year" became a mocked stereotype, satirizing answerers who fabricated elite personas and concocted success stories. "On Zhihu, share stories you just made up" became a popular meme, with netizens jokingly calling Zhihu "Fake-hu" or "Bullshit-hu."

"Story Magazine"-ization and Yanxuan Columns

Interestingly, after discovering the "storytelling" phenomenon, Zhihu didn't simply crack down but instead commercialized it. The "Yanxuan Column" launched in 2019 essentially acknowledged the transformation of community nature—from knowledge repository to online fiction reading platform. In Yanxuan columns, numerous fictional stories under the guise of "real experiences" became paid content, with genres like romance, suspense, and workplace "pleasure-reading" thriving.

This transformation reflected the dilemma inevitably faced by communities during commercial expansion: content quality dilution and signal-to-noise ratio decline are almost unavoidable. Zhihu's case proves that when a community moves from "niche elite" to "mass platform," its core character is often completely reshaped.

4.3 Xiaohongshu: From Overseas Shopping Community to Lifestyle Bible

Establishing "Planting Grass" Culture

After 2014, Xiaohongshu gradually expanded from a single overseas shopping guide community to a "lifestyle platform" covering beauty, skincare, fashion, travel, food, fitness, and more. In this transformation, "planting grass" (种草, zhǒngcǎo—inspiring desire to purchase) became Xiaohongshu's core vocabulary—it refers to using authentic (or seemingly authentic) user experience sharing to stimulate others' purchasing desires.

Xiaohongshu's content format centered on "photo notes," with users sharing their consumer experiences, outfit tips, and travel guides, accompanied by carefully photographed images. Unlike Weibo's fragmentation and WeChat Moments' privacy, Xiaohongshu's content had more "practical value"—it directly influenced consumption decisions. This "A (awareness)-I (interest)-P (purchase)" chain gave Xiaohongshu inherently high commercial value.

KFS Model and the Consumption Loop

Xiaohongshu gradually formed a unique "KFS (KOL Key Opinion Leaders + Feeds + Search)" marketing model. Brands no longer just placed hard ads but published "planting grass notes" through KOLs/KOCs (Key Opinion Consumers), then pushed them to potential audiences through feeds, and finally intercepted definite purchase intent through search. This model blurred the boundary between advertising and content, making the community thoroughly commercialized.

However, commercialization also brought a crisis of trust. "Filter fraud" (photos over-beautified with severe discrepancy from actual products) and "fake grass planting" (brand-paid soft advertising disguised as genuine experiences) frequently occurred, triggering users' doubts about Xiaohongshu content authenticity. How to find balance between commercial monetization and community trust became Xiaohongshu's ongoing challenge.

Gender Structure and "Male User" Anxiety

For a long time, Xiaohongshu's female users accounted for over 90%, forming a community ecology centered on the "she economy." This highly concentrated gender structure was both an advantage (precise user profiles, high-conversion consumption scenarios) and a limitation (growth ceiling, content category constraints).

To break through the growth bottleneck, Xiaohongshu began attempting to attract male users in 2018-2019, promoting "straight male" content like digital tech, camping, fishing, and fitness. However, this strategy progressed slowly, as single-gender communities faced enormous cultural resistance in transitioning to all-gender platforms. It wasn't until the 2020s that Xiaohongshu successfully attracted a batch of male users through camping economy and outdoor sports content.

4.4 Hupu: Straight Male Community's Persistence and Gender Division

In stark contrast to Xiaohongshu's "she economy" is Hupu—China's internet's most typical "straight male community." Founded in 2004 and starting as an NBA basketball forum, Hupu gradually expanded into a comprehensive sports community covering soccer, esports, digital tech, and automobiles.

Hupu's core section "Buxingjie" (Walking Street, originally "Open Zone") formed a unique male discourse system. Users call themselves "JRs" (家人们, jiārénmen, "family members"), use "绿了" (lǜle, "got green"—being cuckolded) to indicate being cheated on, "卧槽" (wò cǎo, "holy shit") to express amazement, and "鉴定为真/假" (jiàndìng wéi zhēn/jiǎ, "verified as true/false") to judge post authenticity. Hupu's annual "Goddess Competition" attracts massive user participation, becoming an annual internet topic in China.

Hupu's community culture is known for being "outspoken" and "sharp-tongued," with particularly intense confrontational discussions about traffic stars (especially "little fresh meat" types). The 2018 "Kun-Lun War" between Hupu and Cai Xukun fans became a landmark event in Chinese internet gender opposition and fan circle culture conflict. This confrontational discussion strengthened the community's internal cohesion but also increasingly made Hupu a closed male echo chamber.

4.5 The Rise of Algorithmic Recommendation: From Moderator Era to Machine Era

During this period, Chinese internet communities underwent a profound paradigm shift: content distribution moved from "human curation/moderator recommendation" to "algorithmic recommendation." Jinri Toutiao (Today's Headlines), launched in 2012, pioneered this transformation, using machine learning algorithms to analyze users' reading preferences and achieve "thousands of people, thousands of faces" personalized recommendations.

The rise of algorithmic recommendation completely changed the logic of content production. In the moderator era, creators were accountable to moderators and core users, pursuing content depth and quality; in the algorithm era, creators were accountable to algorithms, pursuing metrics like click-through rates, completion rates, and interaction rates. Content production became a "problem-solving" process targeting algorithms—what kind of titles attract clicks, what kind of openings retain users, what kind of pacing improves completion rates...

This transformation was especially evident in short video. Douyin (TikTok), launched in 2016, pushed the "data attraction model" to the extreme: single-column full-screen feeds stripped users of choice, algorithms captured users' micro-expressions at millisecond speed, and creators mass-produced homogeneous content under platform "discipline." This marked Chinese internet communities moving from "human governance" to "machine governance," laying the groundwork for "The Algorithm Era and Tale of Two Cities in Short Video."

4.6 Summary: The Eternal Contradiction Between Breaking Out and Maintaining Tone

2014-2019 was both the golden age and transformation period of Chinese vertical communities. Bilibili, Zhihu, Xiaohongshu, Hupu and others all experienced expansion from "niche elite" to "mass platform." In this process, they all faced the same core contradiction without exception: breaking out brings growth but dilutes community culture; maintaining tone preserves identity but limits growth ceiling.

Bilibili maintained certain community purity through the 100-question exam and danmu culture, but the "Hou Lang" controversy exposed rifts between old and new users; Zhihu seriously "watered down" after open registration, transforming from a knowledge community into a "story magazine"; Xiaohongshu struggled to balance commercialization with trust, with "filter fraud" becoming an inescapable shadow; Hupu persisted in straight male culture but increasingly became an island.

During this period, algorithmic recommendation began replacing human curation as the core mechanism for content distribution. This transformation would reach its peak in the next period (2016-2024), with the rise of Douyin and Kuaishou completely reshaping Chinese people's sense of time and information acquisition methods. Xiaohongshu, meanwhile, would complete another metamorphosis in the 2020s from "planting grass community" to "lifestyle search engine."

Chapter Five: The Algorithm Era and Tale of Two Cities in Short Video: The Divergence of Douyin and Kuaishou (2016-2024)

Algorithmic recommendation began replacing human curation as the core content distribution mechanism. In 2016, this revolution reached its decisive moment—the launch of Douyin marked the full arrival of the short video era. Over the next eight years, the "twin stars" of Douyin and Kuaishou completely reshaped Chinese people's sense of time, methods of information acquisition, and even class perception. Meanwhile, Xiaohongshu completed an astonishing transformation from "planting grass community" to "lifestyle search engine," while once-glorious traditional communities accelerated their decline in this algorithmic revolution.

5.1 Douyin: Centralized Theater and Algorithmic Discipline

From A.me to Douyin: ByteDance's Short Video Ambition

On September 26, 2016, ByteDance launched an app called "A.me," which was Douyin's predecessor. At that time, the short video track already had players like Kuaishou, Meipai, and Miaopai, but Zhang Yiming's team keenly captured a gap—music short videos. On December 10, 2016, A.me was officially renamed "Douyin," positioning itself as a "15-second music short video community focused on young people."

Douyin's early user profile was highly focused: first and second-tier cities, ages 18-24, pursuing trends and self-expression among youth. Through deep integration with popular music, Douyin quickly established a "cool" brand perception among young demographics. In the second half of 2017, Douyin's daily active users exceeded 10 million; during Spring Festival 2018, leveraging virally spreading challenges like the "Seaweed Dance," Douyin's daily actives surged from under 40 million to nearly 70 million, completing the crucial leap from niche to mainstream.

Single-Column Full-Screen: Immersive Design That Strips Choice

Douyin's success lay in pushing the "data attraction model" to its extreme. Unlike Kuaishou's double-column feed, Douyin's pioneering single-column full-screen feed fundamentally changed the relationship between users and content.

In traditional feed products, users needed to actively "choose" which content to click; in Douyin's single-column mode, content automatically plays full-screen, users don't need to click, just swipe. This "spoon-feeding" interaction design created extremely low content consumption barriers while also stripping users of choice—you can't predict what's next, you can only passively accept the algorithm's recommendations.

This design enabled the algorithm to capture users' micro-expressions at millisecond speed: dwell time, completion rate, whether liked, whether commented, whether shared... Every subtle behavioral data point is recorded, analyzed, and learned by the algorithm. Douyin's recommendation system thus becomes increasingly "understanding," while users unknowingly fall into a carefully designed "time black hole."

Algorithmic Discipline: Creators' "Problem-Solving" Dilemma

Douyin doesn't just distribute content, it also "educates" creators.

Through official channels like "Douyin Creator Assistant" and "Juliang Academy," the platform continuously publishes trending challenges, popular BGM, viral templates and filters, inducing creators to imitate. Officials even explicitly tell creators: what kind of thumbnails increase click rates, what kind of openings retain users, what kind of pacing improves completion rates.

Under this mechanism, creators are no longer accountable to fans but to algorithms. Content production becomes an industrialized "problem-solving" process targeting algorithmic metrics (completion rate, interaction rate, follower conversion rate). Creators study the "Golden 3-Second Rule" (first 3 seconds must grab attention), "hook copy" (using suspense to induce users to watch til the end), "data review" (analyzing each video's traffic curve)... Creative artistry yields to data certainty.

MCN Industrialization: "Influencers" on Assembly Lines

Douyin's early traffic dividend attracted numerous MCN (Multi-Channel Network) agencies to enter. Unlike Kuaishou's family-style, workshop-style growth, Douyin's MCNs more resembled precision-running content factories.

Top MCNs like Worry-Free Media and OST Media established complete assembly lines from talent selection, training, content planning, filming and production to commercial monetization. An ordinary person entering an MCN, after standardized training and packaging, could be "manufactured" into an "influencer" with millions of followers within months. This industrialized production model maximized the efficiency of attention monetization but also led to highly homogeneous content—opening Douyin, you see countless similar faces, similar copy, similar routines.

From Entertainment to Infrastructure: Douyin's E-commerce Transformation

After 2020, Douyin began an aggressive e-commerce transformation. From initial "watch and buy" to "interest e-commerce," to the "full-domain interest e-commerce" proposed in 2023, Douyin attempted to upgrade itself from an entertainment platform to consumption infrastructure.

Douyin e-commerce's core logic is "products find people"—users don't need to actively search for products; the algorithm pushes products to you through short videos or livestreams based on your interest tags. This model created massive "impulse consumption" and spawned phenomenal livestream rooms like "Oriental Selection" and "Make a Friend."

By 2024, Douyin was no longer just a short video platform, but simultaneously:
• A national-level entertainment distraction tool
• Young people's news and information source
• Local life services portal (group buying, takeout)
• A trillion-level e-commerce platform
• Job recruitment channel

This "super app" ambition made Douyin one of the most dominant platforms in the mobile internet era.

5.2 Kuaishou: Seeing "Invisible" China and the "Laotie Economy"

From GIF Tool to Short Video Community: Kuaishou's Alternative Origins

Kuaishou's history is longer than Douyin's, but its development path was completely different.

In March 2011, Cheng Yixiao created "GIF Kuaishou," initially just a tool for making GIF animations. In summer 2013, Su Hua joined and led Kuaishou's transformation toward short video community. Unlike Douyin's penetration starting from first-tier city elites, Kuaishou was rooted in the sinking market from the beginning—third and fourth-tier cities, counties, and rural areas.

This user profile difference determined Kuaishou and Douyin's completely different community temperaments. If Douyin is the refined "theater" of first and second-tier cities, then Kuaishou is the "town square" of vast rural China.

Fair and Inclusive: Traffic Philosophy Suppressing the Head

Kuaishou's early "fair and inclusive" traffic distribution logic was its core differentiator from Douyin.

In Kuaishou's algorithm design, Gini coefficient control was deliberately introduced—suppressing excessive concentration of top traffic and allocating more exposure opportunities to ordinary creators. This meant that even if you were just an ordinary person with few followers, your videos still had a chance to be seen.

This traffic philosophy made Kuaishou a window to "see 'invisible' China." On Kuaishou, you could see:
• A pig butcher in Northeast rural areas documenting daily life
• A beekeeper in Guizhou deep mountains showing honey extraction
• Construction workers on sites filming high-altitude work
• Assembly line factory girls sharing three-shift life

These populations outside mainstream media and first-tier city perspectives gained a microphone for self-expression for the first time through Kuaishou. They were no longer the silent majority being represented, but subjects of content.

"Laotie" Culture: Emotional Contract and Trust Economy

"Laotie" (old iron/old buddy) originated from Northeast dialect, meaning extremely close friends. In Kuaishou's context, it evolved into a unique economic-emotional contract.

Kuaishou hosts (mostly lower-class youth or farmers) exchange authentic, sometimes even rough living displays for audience tips and recognition. An audience's "Laotie 666" is both praise and affirmation of this vitality. This relationship differs from fans' unidirectional admiration of "influencers" on Douyin, being more equal and intimate—a true "buddy" relationship.

"Earthy taste" (土味, tǔwèi) is Kuaishou content's label, once ridiculed and resisted by mainstream discourse. However, this "earthiness" precisely reflects the real lives of hundreds of millions at the grassroots. Kuaishou users don't pursue refined filters and perfect scripts—they want authenticity, even if that authenticity is rough or even awkward.

Trust E-commerce: Transaction Logic Based on Personal Relationships

Based on "laotie" relationship trust, Kuaishou's livestream selling showed extremely high conversion rates.

Fans often purchase products not because of the products themselves but to support hosts ("give laotie face"). This transaction model based on personal relationships differs completely from Taobao's search and price comparison and Douyin's algorithm recommendation. On Kuaishou, the trust between host and fans is core capital; once a host "overturns" (selling fake goods or deceiving fans), this trust collapses instantly.

Top Kuaishou hosts like the Simba (Xin Youzhi) family are典型 representatives of this "trust e-commerce" model. Simba created sales myths of billions in single livestreams by leveraging deep emotional connections with fans, but also suffered a severe trust crisis due to the October 2020 "fake bird's nest" incident—after the November exposure, Simba was banned by the platform, becoming a landmark case of trust collapse in the livestream e-commerce industry.

Kuaishou's Dilemma: The Dilemma Between Breaking Out and Persistence

After 2019, facing Douyin's strong competition, Kuaishou began difficult attempts to break out. Signing Jay Chou, sponsoring Spring Festival Gala, bringing in celebrity hosts... Kuaishou tried to tear off the "earthy taste" label and attract first and second-tier city users.

However, this breaking-out strategy brought community culture dilution. Old users complained "Kuaishou has changed," while new users still felt "Kuaishou is still earthy." Kuaishou fell into a dilemma similar to Bilibili and Zhihu: persisting in tone limits growth, aggressive breaking out loses soul.

By 2024, though Kuaishou remained solidly second in the short video track, the gap with Douyin continued widening. The once-proud "fair and inclusive" algorithm also gradually compromised under commercialization pressure, with top concentration continuously increasing. Kuaishou's "town square spirit" is fading.

5.3 Xiaohongshu's Re-evolution: From Planting Grass Community to Lifestyle Search Engine

Entering the 2020s, Xiaohongshu completed another astonishing transformation—it's becoming young people's "lifestyle search engine," gradually replacing Baidu's position in life decision-making domains.

Search Behavior's Generational Migration

A significant change is occurring: more and more young people (Gen Z, Generation Alpha) no longer use Baidu to search life-related questions but directly open Xiaohongshu.

• "How to dress" → go to Xiaohongshu
• "Where to travel" → go to Xiaohongshu
• "What to eat" → go to Xiaohongshu
• "How to write resume" → go to Xiaohongshu
• "Grad school strategies" → go to Xiaohongshu
• "Rental pit avoidance" → go to Xiaohongshu

Q4 2024 data shows Xiaohongshu daily average search volume reached about 600 million, approaching half of Baidu's. Platform monthly active users around 320-340 million.

The reason for this migration: users trust "real people's" experience sharing more than search engines' cold webpage links filled with SEO ads. When you search "XX city 3-day tour guide," Baidu gives you identical tourism website advertorials, while Xiaohongshu gives you real users' itinerary records, pit-stepping experiences, and actual photos. Authenticity becomes Xiaohongshu's biggest competitive barrier.

From "Planting Grass" to "Life Manual"

Xiaohongshu's content boundaries continue expanding. It's no longer just a "planting grass" platform for beauty, fashion, and travel, but a "manual" covering all aspects of life:

• Workplace strategies: interview skills, PPT templates, workplace interpersonal relationships
• Life skills: cooking tutorials, organization and tidying, pet care guides
• Emotional counseling: dating advice, breakup healing, marriage management
• Health and medical: symptom self-check, medical process, recovery experiences
• Legal and financial: rental contracts, financial basics, rights protection guides

This content generalization essentially makes Xiaohongshu a "lifestyle encyclopedia," while its UGC (User Generated Content) attributes give this encyclopedia unique "human touch" and "grassroots feel."

Aesthetic Homogenization and "Filter Anxiety"

However, the double-edged sword effect of algorithmic recommendation is equally significant on Xiaohongshu.

Under the algorithm's amplification, specific lifestyles instantly become templates for universal imitation. "New Chinese style dress" goes viral, streets fill with horse-face skirts; "special forces tourism" goes viral, young people check off ten cities in three days; "camping style" goes viral, urban outskirts' lawns are occupied by tents...

This aesthetic homogenization leads to individuality dissolution and lifestyle homogenization. Countless "Little Kyoto," "Little Kamakura," "Little Santorini" photo spots emerge nationwide, essentially copy-paste driven by algorithms.

The deeper problem is "filter anxiety." Xiaohongshu's refined lifestyle imagery—perfect outfits, perfect travels, perfect breakfasts—brings enormous psychological pressure to ordinary users. "Why doesn't my life look like Xiaohongshu?" becomes a widespread anxiety. The 2021 "Xiaohongshu filter scenery overturn" incident triggered public opinion storm, precisely this trust crisis's concentrated eruption.

Male Users and Content Breaking Out

Xiaohongshu's strategy to heavily expand male users from 2020 achieved significant results in 2021-2023. In July 2021, male user proportion first exceeded 30%. The camping economy explosion was a landmark node—Xiaohongshu successfully promoted "camping" from niche hobby to national trend.

However, single-gender community transition to all-gender platform still faces cultural resistance. The influx of male users changed community atmosphere, with some female users complaining "comment sections changed taste." How to maintain community tone while expanding remains Xiaohongshu's ongoing challenge.

5.4 Time Devoured: Data Perspective and Generational Divide

Shocking Time Bills

According to CNNIC's 53rd Statistical Report (as of December 2023) and latest 2024 data, China's internet presents the following landscape:

• Total netizens: 1.092 billion (December 2023) / 1.108 billion (December 2024)
• Internet penetration rate: 77.5% (December 2023) / 78.6% (December 2024)
• Mobile internet ratio: 99.9%
• Per capita daily mobile internet usage: approximately 5.5-7.25 hours (different statistical calibers)
• Short video duration proportion: approximately 34%-36%
• Short video monthly active users: exceeding 1 billion (approximately 1.026-1.040 billion)

This means that of Chinese people's waking hours daily, a considerable proportion is spent on phone screens; and of this screen time, over one-third is devoured by short videos.

Douyin and Kuaishou are no longer just entertainment tools, they've become:
• National news and information sources (scrolling Douyin to watch news)
• De facto search engines (Douyin search tutorials)
• Trillion-level e-commerce platforms (livestream selling)
• Local life service portals (group buying, takeout)

Short video has become the internet's second-largest track after instant messaging, deeply embedded in Chinese people's daily lives.

Generational Divide: Different Generations' Digital Habitats

Notably, different generations of Chinese netizens inhabit completely different digital spaces:

Post-60s, Post-70s: WeChat is their digital life center. Moments, official accounts, and video accounts constitute their main channels for information acquisition and socialization. They also started scrolling Douyin and Kuaishou, but more as passive consumers than active creators.

Post-80s: Experienced complete migration from BBS to Weibo to short video. They're refugees from Tianya and Maopu, holding complex emotions about "classical internet's" passing. Use WeChat at work, scroll Douyin for entertainment, occasionally still open Douban and Zhihu.

Post-90s: Mobile internet natives. Weibo is their public square, Xiaohongshu their life guide, Bilibili their spiritual corner, Douyin their time black hole. They flexibly switch between different platforms with ease.

Post-00s, Post-10s: Short video natives. For them, Douyin and Kuaishou aren't "new media" but natural existences like air. They may never have completely read a long article but can acquire and judge information within 15 seconds. Their attention has been deeply shaped by algorithms.

Algorithm Cocoons: Can We Still Dialogue?

When everyone lives in algorithm-customized information cocoons, cross-generational, cross-circle dialogue becomes increasingly difficult.

Parents scroll to wellness videos and positive energy chicken soup, children scroll to anime and kuso; small-town youth scroll to earthy situation comedy, first-tier white-collars scroll to refined vlogs; male users scroll to beautiful women and games, female users scroll to fashion and parenting...

Algorithms don't produce content, but algorithms decide what content you can see. When everyone can only see content they "like," the foundation for public discussion is collapsing. We gain personalized information feeds but may be losing the ability to dialogue with each other.

This, perhaps, is the algorithm era's most profound cost.

5.5 Summary: From Square to Theater, From Depth to Speed

2016-2024 were eight years of fundamental transformation in Chinese internet community forms.

Form transformation: Text yielded to video, long content to short content, depth to speed. 15-second short videos replaced tens-of-thousands-word long posts, becoming mainstream information transmission carriers.

Power transformation: Moderators yielded to algorithms, human curation to machine recommendation. Content's life and death no longer decided by community managers but judged by cold data metrics.

Relationship transformation: From "stranger communities" to "algorithm feeding." In the traditional BBS era, users actively sought like-minded strangers; in the algorithm era, users passively accept system-pushed content, with human connections replaced by people-algorithm gaming.

Commercial transformation: From "traffic monetization" to "attention harvesting." Douyin, Kuaishou, Xiaohongshu all convert user attention into commercial value, with community "publicness" yielding to "commerciality."

In this revolution, traditional BBS communities accelerated decline. Tianya's closure in 2023 became this era's most symbolic farewell. The next chapter will return to that farewell scene, asking: when Tianya died, what did we truly lose?

Chapter Six: Nostalgia and Farewell: Tianya's Closure and "Tears of the Times"

On April 1, 2023, Tianya Community was shut down due to long-term server fee arrears, making the website inaccessible. According to reports, Tianya owed Hainan Telecom IDC machine room fees alone over 10 million yuan, while the company's total enforcement amount exceeded 146 million yuan. On May 27, Tianya founder Xing Ming officially confirmed platform closure. The company had sold all assets except data to server operators, with the team drastically reduced.

Subsequently, a group of former employees and loyal fans launched a week-long, round-the-clock livestream fundraising campaign on short video platform Douyin, attempting to "restart Tianya." The goal was to let the website briefly revive, at least allowing users to download their posts and files. However, this week-long livestream only raised approximately 204,700 yuan (livestream income 149,900 yuan + donations 54,800 yuan), far below the 3 million yuan target. The livestream not only frequently experienced technical glitches but was also criticized for selling products (T-shirts, fruit, nuts) unrelated to the website. Netizens also pointed out that livestreaming on Douyin (mainly used by young people) might not reach Tianya's target audience.

Tianya's collapse marked the complete end of the PC classical internet era. Old users mourned not just the data but that era when "horses were slow, letters were distant," when people willingly spent hours writing and reading posts, debating public affairs—the slow-reading era. The livestream restart's failure cruelly proved: nostalgia cannot monetize, old era relics powerless to support an outdated platform. Chinese netizens increasingly use one phrase to describe Tianya's fate—"tears of the times."

6.1 Deep Reasons for Tianya's Death

Tianya's decline wasn't overnight. As early as the early 2010s, with Weibo's rise, Tianya's quality creators began flowing out. Long post culture was replaced by fragmented reading, deep discussion crushed by 140-character instant expression. Tianya management's vacillation on commercialization paths—successively attempting e-commerce, blockchain, even issuing cryptocurrency—yet never finding a sustainable profit model.

The deeper reason lies in the transformation of zeitgeist. The era of Tianya's prosperity was when Chinese society was enthusiastic about public issues, believing in rational debate. Netizens then believed "onlooking changes China," that words typed on keyboards could shake reality. By the algorithm era, attention was sliced into 15-second fragments by short videos, public discussion yielding to private domain emotional venting, depth to traffic. The "town square spirit" Tianya represented had become incompatible with this era.

6.2 Maopu's Decline and the End of Forum Era

Tianya wasn't the only fallen giant. Maopu, after multiple failed transformations, had long become an internet "living fossil." In 2018, Maopu servers shut down, the website once inaccessible. Though subsequently barely restored, it had long been deserted. Once creating countless internet buzzwords and launching Sister Furong to fame, Maopu Dazahui now only had scattered nostalgic posts and screens full of ads.

Though Baidu Tieba survived until today relying on Baidu's traffic advantage, its golden age similarly gone forever. The 2016 "Tieba Hemophilia Bar Selling" incident exposed commercialization's erosion of community ecology. Numerous bar masters were replaced, quality communities occupied by ads and marketing accounts. Once the "Baidu Louvre" Li Yi Bar also couldn't escape traffic decline fate.

6.3 The Meaning of Nostalgia: What Are We Really Missing?

When people miss Tianya, Maopu, SMTH, what exactly are they missing? Perhaps not just a website, but a vanished internet spirit: equality brought by anonymity, deep thinking brought by long-form reading, community self-governance brought by moderator systems, and connections established among strangers based on intellectual resonance.

In that "slow horses" era, one ID could carry a person's second life. Netizens willingly spent hours composing a post, staying up all night following a series, going through fire and water for a never-met netizen. This "slowness's" value has become a luxury in algorithm-driven fast-food times.

Tianya's closure was not just a business case failure but an era's curtain call. It reminds us: the internet doesn't have only one form, communities needn't only be defined by algorithms. On the road pursuing efficiency and traffic, we may have lost something more precious—depth, connection, and that willingness to pause for strangers.

Chapter Seven: Governance and Regulation: From Wild Growth to Digital Rule of Law (1994-2024)

Policy regulation has always been an important variable in China's internet community development. Over thirty years, regulatory models moved from rough to refined, from single administrative orders to rule-of-law governance, profoundly reshaping community forms and boundaries. This chapter systematically reviews the evolution trajectory of China's internet governance, analyzing key policy nodes' far-reaching impacts on community ecology.

7.1 The Evolution of Real-Name Systems: From Backend to Frontend

China's internet real-name system underwent a twenty-year gradual implementation process, roughly divided into four stages:

Stage One: Initial Period (2002-2005)

In 2002, the State Council issued "Regulations on the Management of Internet Access Service Business Venues," requiring internet cafes to real-name register internet users—this was China's internet real-name system's earliest practice. On March 16, 2005, the "316 Incident" occurred at Tsinghua University BBS "SMTH"—under school requirements, the forum restricted off-campus IP access and implemented real-name registration, triggering strong backlash from on and off-campus users. This marked university BBS moving from open to closed, and the real-name system's first large-scale implementation in specific communities. Subsequently, Peking University's Weiming, Fudan's Riyueguanghua and other university BBSs followed suit. China's university BBS golden age thus ended.

Stage Two: Experimental Period (2006-2011)

During this period, policymakers began exploring broader-scope internet real-name systems. In 2006, relevant departments proposed blog real-name system initiatives but faced strong public backlash and ultimately weren't fully implemented. In 2010, MIIT considered mobile phone real-name systems but similarly progressed slowly due to execution difficulty and privacy controversies. This stage's characteristic was "policy testing, repeated gaming," with real-name system boundaries still unclear.

Stage Three: Full Implementation Period (2012-2017)

On December 28, 2012, the National People's Congress Standing Committee passed "Decision on Strengthening Network Information Protection," first establishing in legal form the basic principle of "backend real-name, frontend voluntary." The decision required network service providers to collect real identity information during user registration but allowed users to use online names when publicly speaking. This compromise sought balance between protecting free expression and combating online crime.

On June 1, 2017, "Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China" officially took effect, elevating real-name system requirements to legal mandatory obligations. The law clearly stipulated that when network operators provide users with information publishing, instant messaging and other services, they should require users to provide real identity information. Mobile phone number binding became the mandatory standard for all mainstream platforms, and "backend real-name" was fully implemented from then on.

Stage Four: Deepening Period (2021-2024)

In 2021, the National Press and Publication Administration issued "Notice on Further Strictly Managing and Effectively Preventing Minors from Becoming Addicted to Online Games," requiring all online games to connect to the national real-name verification system, with minors only allowed 1 hour of gaming from 8-9 PM on Fridays, Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays. This was the extreme application of real-name systems in specific domains.

In late October 2023, major social platforms began implementing "million-follower influencer frontend real-name" policy, requiring accounts with over 1 million followers to publicly display real names. This marked real-name systems moving from "backend" to "frontend," with influencers' public responsibilities further strengthened. Supporters believed this helped curb rumor spreading and "influencer agenda-setting" phenomena; critics worried this would compress public discussion space and intensify self-censorship.

The Double-Edged Sword Effect of Real-Name Systems

Real-name systems effectively curbed online fraud, rumor spreading, and online violence, enhancing cyberspace credibility and traceability. But simultaneously, they changed early internet's "anonymous carnival" attributes, with users' self-expression beginning to be constrained by stronger social pressures. "Invisibility" became an unattainable wish, while "self-censorship" became an instinct.

7.2 "Qinglang" Action Normalization and Fan Circle Governance

Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission's Establishment and Governance System Reconstruction

On February 27, 2014, the Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs (later changed to Commission) was established and held its first meeting, marking China's internet governance entering the "top-level design" era. The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC, State Internet Information Office) as the leading group's office agency became the core department for online content management. Subsequently, governance targeting online chaos entered normalization and specialization stages.

2021 Qinglang Action: Fan Circle Governance's Watershed

On June 15, 2021, CAC launched the "Qinglang·Fan Circle Chaos Rectification" special action, a landmark event in community governance. Targeting fan mutual attacks, fundraising for rankings, disparagement incitement, data manipulation and other chaos on platforms like Weibo, Douban, and Tieba, regulatory departments issued systematic measures:

• Cancel celebrity artist rankings: All platforms comprehensively removed celebrity ranking functions, cutting off "data workers'" operational foundation
• Regulate fan group management: Dissolve irrational fan groups, rectify fan circle mutual attacks and abuse
• Restrict minor consumption: Prohibit minor tipping, limit behaviors inducing fan consumption
• Rectify professional anti-fans: Combat organized online water army and professional anti-fan industry chains

This action directly changed communities' traffic logic. Previously, fans could "brush data" for idols through "voting and ranking," with data results in turn affecting commercial resource allocation, forming a "traffic supremacy" vicious cycle. Qinglang Action broke this closed loop, curbing data worker-style manipulation behaviors, with community ecology returning to rationality.

Douban's Darkest Moment

2021 was also Douban's turning point. Facing massive fan circle comment control wars and some groups' sensitive discussion content, State Cyberspace Administration penalized Douban multiple times:

• Throughout 2021, Douban accumulated fines exceeding 9 million yuan
• Multiple orders for removal and rectification
• "Douban Goose Group" suspended for rectification on September 23, 2021, permanently closed on April 14, 2022
• Long-term suspension of reply functions ("building towers"), severely impacting community activity

Douban was forced to modify rating mechanisms, increasing "trustworthy users'" weight and eliminating abnormal rating data. These rectification measures marked the end of that era of free wild growth on Douban. After Goose Group and multiple affiliated groups were permanently closed, large numbers of users dispersed to overseas platforms like Reddit and Telegram, forming a典型 "Digital Diaspora."

Qinglang Action's Normalization

Since 2021, "Qinglang" special actions became annual regular governance mechanisms, each year targeting different domains for rectification:

• 2022: Rectifying online violence, fan circle chaos resurgence, minor online environment
• 2023: Rectifying self-media chaos, "self-media" bottomless traffic-seeking
• 2024: Rectifying online rumors, false information, "headline party"
• 2025: Continuing to advance online ecological governance

This normalized special governance model kept platforms always under high-pressure regulation, with content review standards continuously tightening.

7.3 Legal Regulation of Online Violence

From "Tongxumen" to "Pink-Haired Girl": Online Violence Evolution

Online violence is a persistent problem in Chinese internet communities. From the 2006 "Tongxumen" incident to the 2023 "Pink-Haired Girl" incident, online violence's forms continuously evolved, but its essence—anonymous group attacks—never changed.

On April 12, 2006, the "Tongxumen" incident erupted. A World of Warcraft player posted on a forum, claiming his wife had an affair with guild leader "Tongxu." The post quickly triggered nationwide attention, with netizens conducting crazy human flesh searches of "Tongxu," publishing his real name, school, photos, even affecting his family. "Tongxu" was forced to drop out, life completely changed. This incident is viewed as a milestone in China's online violence history, first demonstrating "online trial's" terrifying power.

In July 2022, the "Pink-Haired Girl" incident began fermenting. A pink-haired graduate student shared graduation photos and daily life online but faced massive online attacks for her hair color and dress, being abused as a "demon," "indecent." The cyberbullying lasted months, with the victim unfortunately passing away on January 23, 2023. This incident again triggered profound social reflection on online violence.

Evolution of Legal Regulation

For online violence, China's legal regulation experienced transformation from "ex post accountability" to "comprehensive governance":

• 2009: "Criminal Law Amendment (VII)" added crimes of "selling or illegally providing citizens' personal information" and "illegally obtaining citizens' personal information," providing criminal law basis for combating human flesh searches
• 2014: The Supreme People's Court issued judicial interpretations, clarifying criminal standards for online insult and defamation
• September 25, 2023: Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security jointly issued "Guiding Opinions on Punishing Online Violence Crimes According to Law"

The 2023 "Guiding Opinions" was a milestone document in online violence governance, with main contents including:

• Clarify online violence's legal characterization: Defining serious online violence behaviors as insult crimes, defamation crimes, infringing citizens' personal information crimes, etc.
• Lower criminal threshold: Clarifying "causing victims' mental disorders, suicide or other serious consequences" can constitute crimes
• Strengthen platform responsibility: Requiring platforms to fulfill main body responsibilities, establish early warning and prevention mechanisms
• Support private to public prosecution: For online violence cases seriously endangering social order, public security organs can initiate public prosecution

This marked community governance moving from "ex post deletion" to "advance prevention" and "severe punishment." However, to truly cure online violence, relying solely on legal means is far from enough—also requires platform technical governance, community self-governance culture cultivation, and citizens' media literacy collective improvement.

7.4 Language Review and "Encrypted Communication"

Formation of Content Review Mechanisms

Under high-intensity content review mechanisms, Chinese internet derived a unique language ecology. Major platforms universally adopted "machine review + human re-check" dual mechanisms:

• Keyword filtering: System automatically blocks content containing sensitive words
• Semantic analysis: AI identifies potentially violating semantics even without sensitive words
• Image recognition: OCR and content recognition for pictures and videos
• User reporting: Introducing crowdsourced review mechanism with user participation

This review system covered political, pornographic, violent, rumor and other dimensions, with sensitive word databases continuously updated and expanded.

Birth of "Encrypted Communication"

To circumvent keyword filtering, Chinese netizens developed an extremely creative "encrypted communication" system:

• Pinyin abbreviations: Such as "zf" (government), "jc" (police), "gg" (brother)
• Homophonic substitution: Such as "river crab" (harmony/censorship), "check water meter" (被请喝茶, being "invited for tea" by authorities)
• Emoji expressions: Using specific emoji symbols to replace sensitive words
• Specific names: Such as "1450" (Taiwan internet water army)
• Image text: Making text into images to evade text review
• Character splitting: Splitting sensitive words into component radicals

This language gaming continues—review systems continuously upgrade, users' evasion strategies also constantly evolve. Some platforms even began reviewing homophonic words and pinyin abbreviations, forcing users to invent more obscure expression methods.

Cost of Language Gaming

Though "encrypted communication" protected intra-circle communication, it also brought significant negative impacts:

• Raised threshold for public discussion: People unfamiliar with "code words" struggle to participate in discussions
• Semantic ambiguity: Obscure expressions used to evade review easily produce misunderstandings
• Further circle stratification: Different groups develop different "code word systems," intensifying "digital Tower of Babel" effect
• Internalization of self-censorship: Users instinctively "pre-review" before speaking, suppressing free expression

Language gaming reflects the tension between governance and expression. On one hand, review mechanisms effectively curbed rumor spreading, hate speech, and illegal information dissemination; on the other, overly sensitive keyword filtering also mis-injured normal public discussion, spawning a "self-castrating" expression culture. How to find balance between order and freedom remains China's internet governance's core proposition.

7.5 Platform Responsibility and Algorithm Governance

Establishment of Platform Main Body Responsibility

Since 2021, "platform main body responsibility" became a core concept in internet governance. Regulatory departments clearly required platforms to assume management responsibility for their content and user behaviors, unable to shirk responsibility under "technical neutrality" pretexts. Main responsibility forms include:

• Content review responsibility: Timely discover, handle, and report illegal and violating content
• User management responsibility: Establish user credit systems, penalize violating users
• Data security responsibility: Protect users' personal information, prevent data leaks
• Algorithm transparency responsibility: Publicly disclose recommendation algorithms' basic principles, accept regulatory review

Algorithm Recommendation Regulation

On March 1, 2022, "Provisions on the Management of Algorithm Recommendations in Internet Information Services" officially implemented—the world's first regulatory legislation specifically targeting algorithm recommendations. Main contents include:

• Prohibit "big data price discrimination": Must not use algorithms to implement differential pricing for consumers
• Guarantee user choice: Must provide options to close algorithm recommendations
• Prohibit inducing addiction: Must not use algorithms to induce user excessive consumption or addiction
• Algorithm filing system: Important algorithms must be filed with regulatory departments

This regulation marked China entering the "algorithm governance" era. However, due to algorithms' "black box" characteristics, actual implementation effects remain to be observed.

7.6 Summary: Governance's Dilemma

Over thirty years, China's internet governance walked a path from "laissez-faire" to "strict control." Real-name systems, Qinglang Actions, online violence legislation, algorithm governance... A series of institutional constructions made cyberspace increasingly standardized and legalized.

However, governance dilemmas always exist:

• Order vs. vitality: Excessive control may stifle community creativity and vitality
• Security vs. freedom: Protecting users from online violence vs. protecting free expression has tension
• Efficiency vs. fairness: Algorithms pursue efficiency maximization, may sacrifice public values
• Globalization vs. localization: China's internet governance model differs from global mainstream

Future Chinese internet governance needs to seek dynamic balance amid these tensions. True "digital rule of law" is not just legal perfection but comprehensive improvement of governance concepts, technical capabilities, and citizens' literacy.

Chapter Eight: Language and Symbols: From Mars Script to YYDS's Aphasia

Over thirty years, Chinese internet community language evolution is a history from creative explosion to vocabulary inflation. Language is not just a communication tool but also a carrier of identity, marker of circle boundaries, and mirror of zeitgeist. This chapter systematically reviews Chinese online language's evolution trajectory, analyzing the social psychology and cultural logic behind it.

8.1 Generational Map of Online Language

First Generation Online Language (1994-2004): Tech Worship and Elite Narrative

China's internet's first generation online language was born in university BBS and tech forums. This period's language characteristics were:

• Strong tech worship coloring: "Daxia" (great hero, referring to tech experts), "Cainiao" (rookie), "Guanshui" (irrigate/post), "Banzhu" (moderator)
• English transliteration and abbreviations popular: BBS, ICQ, Netizen, E-mail
• Emoticon embryos: :-), :-P, ^_^
• Written and spoken language mixed: Retained considerable written language norms

This period's online language users were mainly university teachers and students and tech personnel, with "ability to go online" itself being status symbol. Language's elite coloring and tech threshold mutually reinforced.

Second Generation Online Language (2004-2012): Grassroots Carnival and Deconstructive Spirit

With internet popularization, online language entered grassroots carnival era. This period's language characteristics were:

• Mars Script popularity: Using obscure characters, variant characters, symbol combinations to replace common Chinese characters, like "莪湜冭瀁冭陽筱駃" (I am too sun too sun little ghost)
• Rise of homophonic memes: "Shenma" (what), "Jiangzi" (like this), "Tongxue" (classmates/shoes), "Beiju" (tragedy/cups)
• Self-mocking culture's emergence: "Diaosi" (loser) word born in Baidu Li Yi Bar, originally satirical反讽 of "tall rich handsome"
• Viral spread of buzzwords: "Geili" (awesome), "Kengdie" (cheating dad), "Shang bu qi" (can't afford to be hurt), "You mu you" (is there or not)

This period's landmark event was the "Jia Junpeng Incident" (2009). A meaningless post on World of Warcraft Tieba "Jia Junpeng, your mom tells you to come home for dinner" surprisingly triggered millions of replies, becoming a spectacle in Chinese internet history. This meaningless collective carnival reflected grassroots netizens' deconstructive impulse toward authority narratives.

Third Generation Online Language (2012-2020): Mobile Internet and Emoji Culture

Mobile internet popularization spawned third generation online language. This period's language characteristics were:

• Emoji culture explosion: From simple emoji to complex GIF animations, emojis became online communication's "new grammar"
• Fan circle slang popularity: "ZQSG" (true feelings), "NSDD" (you're right), "XSWL" (laughing to death)
• Abbreviation culture's extremity: Almost all common phrases could be abbreviated to pinyin initials
• Rise of "meme culture": Specific events or characters' fragments were deconstructed, recombined, spread, forming "memes"

Emoji rise especially worth noting. It's not just language supplement but to some extent replaced language. An appropriate emoji beats a thousand words. However, emoji popularity also brought a problem: when complex emotions are simplified to several preset images, are we losing the ability to express precisely?

Fourth Generation Online Language (2020-2024): Short Video Era's Return to Vernacular

Short video rise made online language present new characteristics:

• Return to vernacular: Short videos mainly oral expression, written online language began returning to vernacular
• BGM (background music) languagefication: Specific music fragments became "language" expressing specific emotions
• Accelerated "meme" turnover: Douyin era "memes'" lifecycle extremely short, often only weeks
• Cross-platform fusion: Different platforms' languages began mutually penetrating, fusing

8.2 Political Economy of Emojis and Pinyin Abbreviations

Pinyin Abbreviations: Circle Barriers and Review Evasion

From early "GG/MM" (brother/sister) to current "YYDS" (forever god), "NSDD" (you're right), "SRDS" (although but), "YYSY" (honestly speaking), pinyin initial abbreviations became Gen Z's universal online dialect.

Abbreviation popularity has multiple reasons:

• Efficiency improvement: On mobile, abbreviations significantly improve typing efficiency
• Circle identity: Mastering specific abbreviations is "insider" marker
• Review evasion: Some abbreviations (like "zf," "jc") are for evading platform keyword review
• Generational separation: "Code words" parents and teachers can't understand strengthen young people's independent space

However, abbreviation proliferation also brought problems. When the same abbreviation has different meanings in different contexts (like "KY" can mean "atmosphere" or "keyboard warrior"), misunderstandings and communication barriers follow. Deeper problem is: when we're accustomed to using four letters to express complex meanings, are we losing the ability to organize complete sentences?

Emojis: Emotional Standardization and Alienation

Emoji rise profoundly changed online communication methods. Its functions include:

• Emotional expression: Subtle emotions difficult to convey through text can be precisely expressed through emojis
• Social lubrication: Awkward conversations can be resolved with emojis
• Identity recognition: Using specific types of emojis (like cat emojis, passive-aggressive emojis) indicates stance and taste
• Cultural participation: Participating in popular emoji creation and spread is a cultural practice

However, emojis also brought emotional standardization. When everyone uses the same emojis to express joy, sadness, anger, is individual emotion's uniqueness erased? When we use a "dog head" to indicate "joking," does it mean we're too lazy to use language to explain our intent?

8.3 Identity Label Evolution: From "Daxia" to "Niuma"

Identity labels in online language reflect different eras' social psychology.

Tech Worship Period (1994-2004): "Daxia" and "Banzhu"

Early online community identity labels embodied respect for technical capabilities and management power. "Daxia" (great hero) meant tech experts, "Banzhu" (moderator) meant community managers. That was an era when "ability to go online" itself was status symbol, with those mastering technical knowledge naturally becoming community opinion leaders. These titles carried martial arts novel romantic coloring, reflecting early netizens' idealistic imagination of virtual worlds.

Self-Mocking Deconstruction Period (2010-2016): "Diaosi" and "Gao Fu Shuai"

"Diaosi" (loser) word born in 2011's Baidu Li Yi Bar, originally satirical self-mockery toward "Gao Fu Shuai" (tall rich handsome). This vulgar vocabulary unexpectedly hit countless young people's psychological pain points—in increasingly obvious class solidification society, they消解 reality pressure through self-mockery, consoling themselves with "diaosi counterattack" narrative.

"Diaosi" culture's popularity had social背景: soaring housing prices, employment difficulties, narrowing upward mobility. Young people expressed dissatisfaction with reality through self-mockery while also seeking collective identity in self-mockery. However, excessive self-mockery may also evolve into self-deprecation, becoming a "learned helplessness" psychological mechanism.

Lying Flat Resistance Period (2020-2024): "Worker," "Niuma" and "Shushu"

After 2020, new generation identity labels reflected young people's helplessness and mild resistance under high-pressure workplace environments:

• "Worker" (打工人): Popular in 2020, both identification with laborer identity and silent protest against "996" work system
• "Niuma" (牛马, cattle and horses): Popular 2023-2024, more pessimistic than "worker," implying being driven like livestock, without dignity
• "Shushu" (鼠鼠, rat-rat): Self-comparing to rats, implying being humble, weak, surviving at社会 bottom

These labels differ from "diaosi": diaosi's self-mockery still retained "counterattack" hope, while "niuma," "shushu's" self-positioning is almost complete giving up—admitting oneself only a tool driven by capital, only value being work. Communities became vents and resonance chambers for this collective emotion.

This identity label evolution reflected China's younger generation's mental transformation from optimism to pessimism, from striving to lying flat. Language change is社会 psychology's thermometer.

8.4 Meme Culture and Deep Thinking's Demise

"Memes'" Essence and Spread Mechanisms

"Meme" proliferation is contemporary internet's significant characteristic. From "blue thin mushroom" (难受想哭, sad want to cry) to "I'm too difficult," from "involution" to "lying flat," from "juejuezi" to "Barbie Q," these vocabularies spread virally then outdated just as quickly.

"Meme" spread mechanisms include:

• Resonance: Hitting masses' common emotions or experiences
• Conciseness: Easy to remember, spread, imitate
• Entertainment: Containing humorous, exaggerated, satirical elements
• Sociality: Using "memes" is social signal, indicating "I also know this"

Accelerated Meme Lifecycle

In short video era, meme lifecycles are drastically compressed. A popular meme from birth to obsolescence often only weeks or even days. This acceleration's consequences are:

• Language "inflation": Old memes devalue too fast, must continuously invent new memes
• Attention fragmentation: Can't keep up with "memes" means being out of touch with young people
• Communication superficialization: Using memes replaces thinking, using labels replaces analysis

Impoverishment of Language Worries

Memes' essence is compressed expression—using minimum characters to convey maximum information. But this compression also brings costs:

• Emotional simplification: Complex emotions simplified to labels. Happy can only say "YYDS," funny only "XSWL," sad only "EMO"
• Thinking degeneration: In rapidly refreshing information flows, people no longer have patience to organize precise, nuanced language, can only use conditioned reflex "memes" to quickly vent emotions
• Discussion shallowness: Deep analysis replaced by "one-sentence summaries," debates replaced by "labeling"

When "YYDS" becomes the only praise method, when "XSWL" becomes the only laughter, language impoverishment also means思维 impoverishment. Are we experiencing collective "aphasia"—not inability to speak but loss of ability to precisely express complex thoughts?

8.5 "Review Style" and Language Alienation

Language Deformation Under Review Pressure

High-intensity content review mechanisms spawned unique "review style" writing:

• Evasive expression: Using homophones, pinyin, symbols to evade sensitive words
• Ambiguous statements: Using "you know," "those who know understand" and other vague expressions to replace explicit statements
• Satirical writing: Surface praise, actual criticism, making review systems难以 judge
• Self-silencing: Actively avoiding any possibly sensitive topics, "saying half leaving half"

This writing method has internalized as many netizens' instinct. They automatically "pre-review" before speaking, deleting any content possibly triggering review. Language self-discipline became unconscious habit.

Language Community Fragmentation

Another consequence of review style is language community fragmentation. Different circles developed different "code word" systems:

• Fan circles have fan circle slang
• Anime has anime terminology
• Gaming circles have gaming abbreviations
• Political discussion has political discussion隐语

These language systems are mutually isolated, forming "digital Towers of Babel." People from different circles, even using the same language, may completely unable to understand what each other is saying.

8.6 Language's Future: New Variables in AI Era

AI-Generated Content's Impact on Online Language

ChatGPT and other large language models' popularization is introducing new variables to online language:

• AI-assisted writing: More people using AI to generate copy, replies, comments
• Human-machine language fusion: AI's expression methods beginning to influence human language habits
• Truth难辨: AI-generated content increasingly difficult to distinguish from human writing
• Language standardization: AI may push online language toward more standard, "correct" direction

New Language Anxieties

AI era brought new language anxieties:

• Individuality dissolution: If everyone uses AI to write, will individual language styles disappear?
• Authenticity crisis: When AI can perfectly imitate any style, does "authentic expression" still have meaning?
• Creativity atrophy: Relying on AI-generated content, will it削弱 human language creativity?

8.7 Summary: Language Is Era's Mirror

Over thirty years, Chinese online language experienced evolution from elite to grassroots, text to visual, creation to imitation. Each generation online language is its era's mirror:

• Tech worship era's "Daxia," "Banzhu" reflected internet's idealistic childhood
• Grassroots carnival era's "Mars Script," "Diaosi" reflected masses' participation deconstructive impulse
• Mobile internet era's emojis, pinyin abbreviations reflected efficiency supremacy and circle stratification
• Short video era's "memes," "Niuma" reflected attention fragmentation and era anxiety

Language evolution is never isolated linguistic phenomenon but symptom of social transformation. When we find ourselves increasingly难以 organize complete long sentences, increasingly relying on emojis and memes to express, increasingly accustomed to "pre-reviewing" our speech—this is not just language change but profound transformation of thinking methods, communication habits, social psychology.

This "aphasia" isn't unique to China but social media era's universal disease. But in Chinese context, it overlaps with review mechanisms, algorithm recommendations, fragmented reading and other factors, forming more complex language ecology. Young people are both creators and prisoners of this language system.

Where will future online language go? Further fragmentation, emojification, memeification, or will it welcome deep expression revival at some juncture? Perhaps the answer depends on whether we still cherish that ability to express complex thoughts with precise language—that "slow," "clumsy," but truly human ability.

Epilogue: Unfinished Digital Migration

Looking back thirty years, China's internet community development history is a grand narrative from "connection" to "fracture" to "recombination."

The first decade (1994-2004) was idealism's decade. Tech elites and intellectuals constructed earliest digital utopias, BBS was思想's bazaar, people believed connection could bring enlightenment. SMTH's black-background green-text interface carried a generation's aspirations for rationality, democracy, freedom. That was a "slow horses" era, every post deserved serious treatment, every ID might hide an interesting soul behind it.

The second decade (2004-2014) was grassroots carnival's decade. Masses flooded in, BBS walls were pushed down, human flesh searches and forum raids displayed grassroots power's野蛮 and生猛, social networks began reconstructing interpersonal relationships. Tianya's "legendary post" culture reached its peak, "Those Things in the Ming Dynasty" proved online communities could nurture serious literary works. But simultaneously, Weibo's rise announced long-form reading's end, fragmentation began eroding depth.

The third decade (2014-2024) was algorithms and capital's decade. Mobile internet stitched everyone to networks through screens, vertical communities and short videos divided user time, planting grass and monetization became core logic, algorithm-woven cocoons made "publicness" increasingly vanish. Tianya's closure became this era's metaphor—nostalgia cannot monetize, depth无人 cares about.

China's internet from SMTH period's open, interconnected "ocean" gradually evolved into today's strictly walled "archipelago." WeChat is life operating system archipelago; Douyin/Kuaishou is entertainment and time-killing archipelago; Xiaohongshu is consumption decision and lifestyle archipelago; Douban is last spiritual refuge archipelago. Archipelagos don't communicate (link blocking), languages don't通 (slang systems).

Standing at 2024's juncture, with AI large models' intervention, community forms may face another round of upheaval. When AI Agents begin generating content in communities, participating in discussions, even simulating emotions, humans may miss that era of overnight tower-building on Tianya forums, using crude text to seek soulmates in BBS—that irretrievable "slow horses" era, also China's internet's most生猛, most vibrant adolescence.

Future Chinese internet, growth已触 ceiling (population dividend disappeared), competition will completely转向 extremely squeezing stock users' time and seeking safe expression cracks under strict regulation. For platforms, "breaking out" is survival desire; for users, finding a "tree hole" where no masks are needed will be eternal rigid demand.

Perhaps the real question isn't how technology evolves but what kind of digital life we want. Passive consumers fed by algorithms or active content creators? Lonely individuals hiding in information cocoons warming up or citizens willing to step out of comfort zones dialoguing with dissenters? Thirty years ago, that email "crossing the Great Wall, toward the world" carried connection dreams. Thirty years later, we perhaps need to ask ourselves: did we truly toward the world, or lock ourselves in more refined cocoons?

Appendix: Major Events in Chinese Internet Communities Timeline (2014-2024)

February 27, 2014 - Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs established
September 26, 2016 - ByteDance launched A.me (Douyin predecessor)
December 10, 2016 - A.me renamed to Douyin
June 1, 2017 - "Cybersecurity Law" officially took effect
March 2019 - Zhihu launched "Yanxuan Member" service
December 31, 2019 - Bilibili's first "Most Beautiful Night" New Year's Eve Gala
March 9, 2020 - Luo Xiang joined Bilibili "Luo Xiang Talks Criminal Law," followers exceeded 1 million same day
May 3, 2020 - Bilibili's "Hou Lang" promotional video sparked controversy
June 5, 2020 - Bilibili officially launched "Knowledge Section"
October 2020 - Simba "fake bird's nest" incident
June 15, 2021 - "Qinglang·Fan Circle Chaos Rectification" special action launched
September 23, 2021 - Douban Goose Group suspended for rectification
March 1, 2022 - "Provisions on the Management of Algorithm Recommendations in Internet Information Services" implemented
April 14, 2022 - Douban Goose Group permanently closed
January 23, 2023 - "Pink-Haired Girl" unfortunately passed away
April 1, 2023 - Tianya Community servers shut down
September 25, 2023 - Supreme Courts and Ministry of Public Security issued "Guiding Opinions on Punishing Online Violence Crimes According to Law"
October 2023 - "Million-follower influencer frontend real-name" policy began implementation

References

• China Internet 30th Anniversary Feature ② | Leaping Through Time, China's Internet 'Metamorphosis' Restarts - New Hunan

• These Thirty Years, China Seized Historical Opportunities of Information Age - Commentary on 30th Anniversary of China's Full-Function Access to International Internet - Cyberspace Administration of China

• [News Essay] What Has Thirty Years of Internet Brought to China - People's Daily Theory Channel

• Do You Know University BBS? - Nanjing University

• SMTH BBS - Wikipedia (Traditional Chinese)

• SMTH BBS - Wikipedia (Simplified Chinese)

• Chinese Internet? History, practice, and globalization - Guobin Yang, Columbia University

• Chinese Internet slang - Wikipedia

• Internet Freedom in China: A Menace that Must Be Removed - China Change

• 'Tears of the Times': The Demise of China's First Major Online Community - Sixth Tone

• The Rise and Fall of China's OG Social Media Platforms - The World of Chinese

• China at the Tipping Point? - ChinaFile

• Contesting Legality in Authoritarian Contexts: Food Safety, Rule of Law and China's Networked Public Sphere - Law & Society Review, Cambridge University Press

• Human Flesh Search - Wikipedia

• Goodbye, Maopu! The End of an Era, 'Internet Celebrity Originator' Finally Exits - People's Daily

• Popular Human Flesh Search Incidents - Northwest Administrative Law Network

• Online Communities Are Done Formula, Transformation and Upgrade Have Promise Formula (Online China) - Xinhua News

• Diba - Wikipedia (Traditional Chinese)

• Diba - Wikipedia (Simplified Chinese)

• Baobao - Wikipedia

• 'Human Flesh Search's' Crime and Punishment - China Youth Daily

• Relevant Department Heads of Supreme Courts Interpret Judicial Interpretation on Criminal Cases of Infringing Citizens' Personal Information - Supreme People's Procuratorate

• Can't Go Back to 'Renren Network': A Social Platform's Rise and Fall and the Youth Memories It Carries - Southern Metropolis Daily

• Renren Network - Wikipedia

• Douban Groups Hidden for Years, and Generation Trapped by 'Parents Are Disasters' - Southern Plus

• Register Analysis of Danmu - Case Study of Bilibili Video Website - Hans Publishing

• Bilibili: Young People's Cultural Community - People's Daily

• An Analysis of Barrage by Using Register Theory—A Case Study of Bilibili Video Website - ResearchGate

• Don't Block Face, Watch Freely! Bilibili's Black Tech Mask Danmu Revealed - InfoQ

• Detailed Analysis of Bilibili's Ecological Moat and User Scale Ceiling Bilibili-SW (9626.HK) - East Money

• Looking at Content and User Evolution from Bilibili - East Money

• 'Yanyan Stories' Behind Zhihu's Web Fiction - China Writers Network

• Zhihu - Wikipedia

• Viral Content Is Metaphysics, But Xiaohongshu Planting Grass Has Formulas - China Europe International Business School (CEIBS)

• Xiaohongshu: Deep Cultivation of Content Community, Mining Planting Grass Economy - East Money

• Xiaohongshu Wholly Acquires AI Search Product 'Diandian', Competing for Life Search Entry? - Southern Metropolis Daily

• User Search Behavior Inventory - East Money

• Dependency Relationship Transformation and Anti-Domestication Practices in Xiaohongshu's 'Search Engine-ization' Phenomenon - Hans Publishing

• Jike - Wikipedia

• Jike App - Apple App Store

• Real-Name System in People's Republic of China - Wikipedia (Simplified Chinese)

• Real-Name System in People's Republic of China - Wikipedia (Traditional Chinese)

• Qinglang Action - Wikipedia

• Typological Analysis and Legal Regulation Research on 'Human Flesh Search' Behavior - Hans Publishing

• Netherlands Will Criminalize 'Human Flesh Search' Behavior - Procuratorial Trends

• List of Mainland China Internet Terminology - Wikiversity

• Top Chinese Internet Slang You Must Know in 2025 - The Oriental Dialogue

• The Chinese Internet Slang You Need to Know in 2025 - StudyCLI

• Wikipedia contributors. (n.d.). SMTH BBS.

• Wikipedia contributors. (n.d.). Tianya Club.

• Li, Xin. (2023, June 05). 'Tears of the Times': The Demise of China's First Major Online Community. Sixth Tone.

• Szonyi, Michael. (2010). Ming Fever: The Past in the Present in the People's Republic of China at Sixty. China Heritage Quarterly.

• Logic Magazine. (2019). A Brief History of the Chinese Internet.

• IMD. (2018). How WeChat's unorthodox user data policy exploded creativity and made it the app for everything.

• Wang, C., Martínez-Rodrigo, E., & García-García, F. (2024). WeChat 'Official Accounts' and Their Impact. Visual Review.

• Liang, Meng. (2022). The end of social media? How data attraction model in the algorithmic media reshapes the attention economy. Media, Culture & Society.

• Ye, Linqi. (2024). Algorithmic pedagogy: How Douyin constructs algorithmic imaginaries for content creators. Platforms & Society.

• Zhou, Min & Liu, Shih-Diing. (2021). Becoming precarious playbour: Chinese migrant youth on the Kuaishou video-sharing platform. The Economic and Labour Relations Review.

• Wang, S., & Li, X. (2022). Kuaishou jiazus: Platform entrepreneurs. LSE Research.

• HKEX / iResearch. (2021). Industry Overview.

• QuestMobile. (2025). 2025 China Mobile Internet Half Year Report.

• CNNIC. (2024). The 53rd Statistical Report on China's Internet Development.

• Sun, A. (2023). The Influence of Douban Reviews and Ratings on Chinese Audiences' Movie-watching Choices. BCP Education & Psychology.

• Wikipedia contributors. (n.d.). Douban.

• Yan, He. (2023). The network community formed by the Douban group. / Grokipedia. (2024). Douban.

• Chen, Y., & Peng, A. Y. (2023). A girlfriend gaze on romantic feelings: Coconstructing postfeminist selfhood on Douban. Feminist Media Studies.

• KR-Asia. (2022). With their voices stifled on Douban, China's largest online community of women seek new home.

• Wikipedia contributors. (n.d.). Five Black Categories.

• PEN International. (2024). China: New campaign to 'standardise' use of language signals further clampdown on online expression.

• MDPI. (2024). Over-indebtedness among Young People in China: Textual Analysis of the 'Debtors Avengers' Community on Douban.

• Pandaily. (2020). Bilibili New Year's Eve Gala Hit Record-Breaking Peak Popularity.

• ThinkChina. (2024). Censored & unstoppable: How male desire and grievances go viral in China.

• Wikipedia contributors. (n.d.). Xiaohongshu.

• 36Kr. (2024). Xiaohongshu campaigns offline with free eggs to hatch new user.

• Alibaba Global Initiatives. (2025). Understanding Xiaohongshu.

• Sixth Tone. (2022). China's Instagram Wants More Male Users. It's Using Women as Bait.

• Freedom House. (2021). Freedom on the Net 2021: China.

• Practical Law. (2024). Regulation of internet content in China.

• Wikipedia contributors. (n.d.). Internet censorship in China.

• China Media Project. (2023). No Class War, Please, We're Communists.

• 36Kr. (2025). CAC launches 'Clear and Bright' special action.

• Search Endurance. (2024). Baidu Statistics.